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THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT:
THE NEW FACE OF COURT STRIPPING*
John Bostont
INTRODUCTION
One of the pillars of civic pride in the Umted States is
the idea of equal justice under law In that light, it is
interesting to contemplate the Prison Litigation Reform Act
('TLRA"), 1 which is explicitly dedicated to creating unequal
justice under law, and does so by establishing a code of special
restrictive rules for one unpopular group of litigants. Indeed, in
typescript the PLRA comprises twelve rather closely spaced
pages dedicated to the purpose of making it more difficult for
prisoners to get into court and, once there, harder to get relief
on claims concerning the conditions of their confinement.
But for purposes of this discussion, it may be more
appropriate to describe the PLRA as representing what may
become the new face of court stripping. In the past, debate
about court stripping was usually framed in terms of
Congress's ability to take away federal court jurisdiction over
* ©2001 John Boston. All Rights Reserved. The present text is a revised
version of informal remarks given at the Brooklyn Law School Edward V. Sparer
Public Interest Law Symposium, "Road Blocks to Justice: Congressional Stripping of
Federal Court Jurisdiction, held on April 5, 2001. 1 wish to thank David Fatln, Esq., of
the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Don A. Lewis,
Esq., of the Prisoners' Rights Project of the New York City Legal Aid Society, for their
valuable comments on this final version.
t Project Director of the Prisoners' Rights Project of the New York City Legal
Aid Society.
I Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996).
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certain kinds of constitutional claims, or certain kinds of
remedies for constitutional violations-i.e., to put them out of
bounds and off limits. 2
The PLRA takes what might be described as a more
nuanced approach. On the surface, at least, it does not draw
lines and erect walls so much as it sets new standards and
establishes new procedures. But a study of the statute and its
consequences will show that its effects may well be as
devastating to the enforcement of constitutional rights as the
simple yes/no, on/off restricting-junsdiction approach that
marked prior efforts at court stripping.
Much of the PLRA is not properly described as
concerning court stripping, at least in any direct way It is
about litigant stripping. The statute contains a series of
measures addressing the potential plaintiff rather than the
court, discouraging prisoners from bringing suit or even
barring them entirely For example, the statute requires
indigent prisoners, unlike any other indigent federal court civil
litigant, to pay the entire filing fee in installments over a
period of time, however long it may take.3 This requirement
may not sound particularly consequential until one realizes
that prisoners are, as a category, probably the most
impoverished people in the United States. A filing fee of $150
or $105 represents an enormous commitment of resources for
them. Paying off such fees of those amounts over a period of
time when they are getting paid pennies an hour, or nothing,
for their labor,4 or are confined in a segregation unit with no
opportunity to work, is a daunting proposition.
2 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Dis-
favored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 135 (1981)
(citing measures then pending to eliminate federal court authority to rule on state
abortion laws or the induction or registration of women for military service).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)-(b) (2001).
4 See, e.g., Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting prisoners' monthly pay of about $15); Jenmngs v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 995
(8th Cir. 1995) (noting lack of pay for prisoners' work in Arkansas); Wendt v. Lynaugh,
841 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Qir. 1988) (noting lack of pay for most prisoners' work m Texas);
Gaston v. Coughlin, 102 F Supp. 2d 81, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting daily pay of $1.55
for prisoner working in food service).
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Second, the PLRA establishes, uniquely for prisoners
challenging prison conditions, a categorical requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.5 In the abstract, such a
requirement may not seem objectionable. However, applied to
the mostly uneducated, unsophisticated, and legally
uncounselled population of the prisons, the requirement invites
technical mistakes resulting in inadvertent non-compliance
with the exhaustion requirement, and barring litigants from
court because of their ignorance and uncounselled procedural
errors.6  It also subjects prisoners' right to sue over
unconstitutional conduct to the considerable power of prison
staff to retaliate against and intimidate prisoners and to
manipulate the operation of grievance systems. 7
5 "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted" 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
6 For example, it is not obvious that a prisoner who seeks only damages for a
completed act such as a physical assault must exhaust administrative grievance
procedures that do not provide damages, but the Supreme Court so held in Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). One wonders how many prisoners will manage to learn
that rule in the very short time periods allowed by some prison systems for filing
grievances. See, e.g., Rhode Island Dep't of Corrections, Policy No. 13.10 DOC (May 20,
1996), at 3 (allowing three days); Metro Dade (Florida) Dep't of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, D.S.O.P No. 15-001 (January 9, 1995) at 2, 4-5 (allowing three working
days to file, forty-eight hours to appeal). Prisoners' claims have also been held barred
for non-exhaustion for their failure to appreciate fine distinctions that many lawyers
would miss. See, e.g., Giano v. Goord, 9 F Supp. 2d 235, 239 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), affrd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
prisoner who had appealed a disciplinary conviction he alleged was filed in retaliation
for protected conduct, based on false misbehavior reports and evidence and a
mishandled urine sample, had not exhausted administrative remedies because he had
not also filed separate grievances about the retaliation, the mishandling of his urine
sample, and the false misbehavior reports and evidence); Hattie v. Hallock, 8 F. Supp.
2d 685, 689 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that in order to challenge a prison rule, the
prisoner must not only appeal from the disciplinary conviction for breaking it, but
must also separately grieve the validity of the rule), judgment amended, 16 F Supp. 2d
834 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
7 One of the dirty secrets of American corrections is the persistence of covert
threats and retaliation against prisoners who complain about their treatment,
including those who use the grievance systems that the PLRA has now made
mandatory. Despite the enormous difficulty of proving this kind of claim, there is a
steady stream of court and jury findings documenting such actions. See, e.g., Walker v.
Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting jury verdict for plaintiff whose legal
papers were confiscated in retaliation for filing grievances); Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming injunction protecting prisoners who were the subject of
retaliation for filing grievances and for litigation); Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087
(8th Cir. 1999) (directing award of compensatory damages to prisoner placed in
2001]
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The PLRA restricts, in prisoner cases, the statutory
attorneys' fees that are available to all other successful civil
rights litigants,8 making it more difficult for prisoners to obtain
the assistance of counsel in civil cases, and thereby devastating
their ability to get relief even if they manage to get into court.
Finally,9 and most offensive in principle, the so-called
three strikes provision bars prisoners from using the n forma
pauperts provisions if they have previously had three or more
complaints or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or
failing to state a claim. 10 This PLRA provision allows an
exception for persons in "imminent danger of serious physical
injury," but not for persons who seek redress for past serious
isolation for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming
jury verdict for plaintiff subjected to retaliation for filing grievances); Hunter v. Heath,
95 F Supp. 2d 1140 (D. Or. 2000) (noting prisoner's acknowledged firing from legal
assistant job for sending "kyte" (officially sanctioned informal complaint) to the
Superintendent of Security concerning the confiscation of a prisoner's legal papers);
Maurer v. Patterson, 197 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding jury verdict for
plaintiff who was subjected to retaliatory disciplinary charge for complaining about
operation of grievance program); Gaston v. Coughlin, 81 F Supp. 2d 381 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (awarding damages for trumped-up disciplinary charge made in retaliation for
prisoner's complaining about state law violations in mess hall work hours), on
reconsideration, 102 F Supp. 2d 81 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Alnutt v. Cleary, 27 F Supp. 2d
395, 397-98 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting jury verdict for plaintiff who was subject to verbal
harassment, assault, and false disciplinary charges in retaliation for his work as an
Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee representative).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee statute applicable to
non-prisoner litigants.
9 "Finally" is rhetorical, since this discussion does not exhaust the strictures of
the PLRA. The statute also contains provisions restricting the use of special masters in
prison cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f); expanding the scope of sua sponte dismissal of
prisoner cases (as well as non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases) from those that are
frivolous or malicious to include those that merely fail to state a claim, 28 U.S.C. §
1997e(c)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and requiring the early screening of prisoner cases
to that end, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A excusing defendants from filing answers in prisoner
cases until ordered to do so by courts, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g); encouraging hearings by
telecommunications and at prisons, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(f); and permitting courts to
deprive adult federal prisoners of time off for good behavior if the court finds that a
claim was filed maliciously or for harassment, or the claimant testified falsely or
otherwise presented false evidence or information, 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2001); requiring
prisoners' damage awards to be paid directly to satisfy their restitution orders, Pub. L
No. 104-134, Title I, § 101[(a)][Title VIII, § 808], Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321-76
renumbered Title I Pub. L. No. 104-140, § 1(a), May 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1327 (not
codified; appears after 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626); and requiring notification of crime victims
of such damage awards. Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title I, § 101[(a)][Title VIII, § 808], Apr.
26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321-76; renumbered Title I Pub. L. No. 104-140, § 1(a), May 2,
1996, 110 Stat. 1327 (not codified; appears after 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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injury, or persons in imminent danger of loss of other
important constitutional rights. Thus, these prisoners must
ante up $105 or $150 up front or they are simply out of court.
There is no time limit on this disqualification," wich has been
applied retroactively to count "strikes" from before the PLRA's
enactment.12 This provision is more than a nuisance or even a
hardship. It is an absolute barrier to a litigant who does not
have the money for filing fees-and many do not. This class of
absolutely indigent prisoners is composed disproportionately of
the most oppressed people in the prison system, those held in
admnnistrative and disciplinary segregation units, frequently
the locus of the worst abuses and harshest conditions in the
prison system.13 These prisoners are generally barred from
prison jobs and have no means of earning money Under the
PLRA, their indigency will bar many of them from any ability
to seek judicial redress.14
11 See, e.g., Evans v. McQueen, No. 97-6471, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26886 (4th
Cir. Sept. 29, 1997) (barring prisoner from proceeding IFP based on "strikes" from
1981-84).12 See, e.g., Welch v. Galie, 207 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2000).
13 See, e.g., Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming
damage award for confinement in feces-smeared strip cell m mental observation unit);
Sheppard v. Phoenix, 1998 WL 397846, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998) (noting
settlement of suit in which defendants conceded constitutional violation with respect to
unnecessary and excessive force in Rikers Island segregation unit); Madrid v. Gomez,
889 F Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding a pattern of excessive force, demal of
adequate medical care, and other Eighth Amendment violations in Pelican Bay
segregation unit).
14 To date, all the federal appeals courts that have considered the question
have upheld the constitutionality of the three strikes provision. See Medberry v.
Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1999); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,
1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. State of Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (10th Cir.
1998); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d
719, 723-29 (11th Cir. 1998); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997). But
see Lewis v. Sullivan, 135 F. Supp. 2d 954, 959-69 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (applying strict
scrutiny, holding provision unconstitutional as a violation of right of court access and
of equal protection as applied to constitutional claims), rev'd, 2002 WL 126607 (7th Cir.
Feb. 1, 2002); Ayers v. Norris, 43 F Supp. 2d 1039, 1050-51 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (applying
similar rationale), overruled by Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2001).
I believe the three strikes provision is unconstitutional for reasons not yet
passed on by any court. Litigation is protected by the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment, which is governed by the same strict standards as other expressive
activity. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985). Since litigation takes
place in court and not in prison, prisoners' litigation is governed by "free world" First
Amendment standards and not the diluted standards applicable when considerations
of prison administration are at stake. Compare Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
403 (1989). Sanctions for litigation are subject to a narrow tailoring principle which
2001]
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In addition to these htigant-stnpping provisions, other
significant provisions of the PLRA do operate more directly as
court-stripping provisions. The most notable of these are the
provision barring actions for mental or emotional injury to
prisoners in the absence of physical injury15 and the series of
provisions restricting prospective relief in prison conditions
litigation. 16 The remainder of this Essay will discuss some of
the interpretive problems, separation of powers issues, and
practical obstacles to the vindication of constitutional rights
that these provisions raise.
I. THE BAN ON ACTIONS FOR MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL
INJURY WITHOUT PHYSICAL INJURY
The PLRA's mental or emotional injury provision may
well present the highest concentration of poor drafting in the
smallest number of words in the entire Umted States Code. It
provides in its entirety- "No Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury "17
It is unclear from the phrase "a prior showing of physical
injury" what "prior" refers to. Since the statute regulates
inter alia limits their application to conscious abuse of the judicial system. See Profl
Real Estate Inv., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (holding
litigation may be suppressed under antitrust statutes only when it is objectively
baseless and for a forbidden anticompetitive purpose); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983),(applying same principle under National Labor
Relations Act). The three strikes provision is therefore unconstitutional insofar as it
sanctions prisoners for complaints that do not state a claim or are legally frivolous,
rather than limiting its scope to those that are malicious or otherwise intentionally
abusive. It is also unconstitutional insofar as it applies a three-strikes rule to all
litigants rather than individually assessing their conduct and insofar as the
prohibition on use of in forma pauperis procedures is unrestricted in time.
Interestingly, Congress has taken the "three strikes" notion a step further in
a little-known provision of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 which
precludes prisoners who have had three dismissals as frivolous or malicious from
contesting a civil forfeiture or appealing in a forfeiture case at all-not just via the in
forma pauperts statutes-absent "extraordinary and exceptional circumstances." 18
U.S.C. § 983(h)(3). To date this statute does not appear to have attracted the attention
of any federal court.
15 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a-g).
17 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
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bringing civil actions, the only grammatically sensible
interpretation of "prior" is that the showing of injury must
occur before the action is filed, a construction which conjures
up visions of hopeful litigants, with their crutches and
bandages and wheelchairs and eye patches, queued outside the
clerk's office waiting to display their stigmata so they can file
their cases. Obviously that is not what Congress had in mind,
especially in a statute addressing litigants who are behind
bars. Since no rational construction of Congress's intent is
apparent, the courts have mostly just pretended that "prior" is
not there, because there is nothing they can do with it, and
have inquired instead whether the plaintiff has sufficiently
pleaded or has submitted admissible evidence of injury 18
On its face, the statute would appear to give prison
officials carte blanche to impose all the mental and emotional
injury they want on prisoners as long as they do not leave any
marks. The courts have partly turned back from that abyss,
holding that the statute does not preclude injunctive litigation,
only damage claims.
The courts have arrived at this conclusion through
somewhat facile means. One appeals court observed, plausibly
enough, that the statutory use of the past tense "suffered"
suggests that the provision does not apply to claims addressed
to the threat of prospective injury However, it continued: "But
more critical is the fact that suits for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the threatened invasion of a
constitutional right do not ordinarily require proof of any
injury other than the threatened constitutional deprivation
itself."19 It is not apparent why a suit intended to avoid a
18 See, e.g., Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
alleged physically intrusive strip searches, characterized as sexual assaults, met the
physical injury requirement at the pleading stage); Sarro v. Essex County Corr.
Facility, 84 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting plaintiffs failure to allege in
his complaint or subsequently any physical injury resulting from restricted
ventilation); Luong v. Hatt, 979 F Supp. 481, 485-86 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that
evidence of abrasions, contusions, cuts, scratches, and bruises did not meet the
physical injury threshold).
i9 Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998); accord,
Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 (iith Cir. 1999), reinstated in pertinent part,
216 F.3d 970, 972 (lith Cir. 2000) (en banc); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th
Cir. 1999) (The underlying claim of an Eighth Amendment violation, however, is
distinct from this claim for resulting emotional damages"; holding that claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief survive); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d
20011
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mentally injurious constitutional violation is not a "civil action
for mental or emotional injury" to the same extent as is a
suit to redress such a violation after the fact.
The source of judicial discomfort with tins provision is
stated most explicitly in the leading case of Zehner v. TrIgg,20
which held that only the availability and enforceability of
injunctive relief saved the statute's constitutionality 21 The
Zehner reasomng is, relatively speaking, encouraging, because
one widely held traditional view of court stripping was that to
forbid all federal court remedies for a constitutional violation
would not by itself be unconstitutional. 22 Nowadays, prisoner
advocates take their victories where they find them, even if
they do not have any effect on the outcome of a particular case.
But tins may yet prove a weak reed; we do not know whether
the courts will stick to it when they are presented, as surely
they will be, with a statute that removes the injunctive powers
of the courts in some category of Bill of Rights challenges.
A
803, 808 (10th Cir. 1999); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 461-63 (7th Cir. 1997);
Amaker v. Goord, 1999 WL 511990 at *5 (S.D.N.Y., Jul 20, 1999) (citing Perkins, 165
F.3d at 807-08; Davis, 158 F.3d at 1346).
20 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997).
21 The Court of Appeals stated:
The district court notes near the conclusion of its discussion on the
issue of Congress' power that "[tihere is a point beyond which
Congress may not restrict the availability of judicial remedies for the
violations of constitutional rights without in essence taking away the
rights themselves." 952 F Supp. at 1331. Because other remedies,
such as "injunctive relief backed up with meaningful sanctions for
contempt," exist even when damages are not available, "[t]hat point
has not been reached by enactment of § 1997e(e) as applied here." Id.
As a legal conclusion, this point is unassailable. Because these
remedies remain, Congress' decision to restrict the availability of
damages is constitutional as applied in this case.
Id.
Other appellate courts have followed Zehner's reasomng without being so
explicit about the unconstitutionality of a prohibition on injunctive relief. See Harris v.
Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in pertinent part, 216 F.3d
970, 972, 985 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342,
1347 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
22 "Congress seems to have plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction when
the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a state court."
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363-64 (1953), reprinted in
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 393 (3d ed. 1988).
[Vol. 67- 2
PRISON LITIGATION REFORMACT
The next question presented by § 1997e(e) is one of
definition: what is mental or emotional injury9 Many highly
intelligent people have spent years thninmg about the
mind/body problem. The drafters of the PLRA do not appear to
have been among them. The statutory language leaves
enormous latitude for interpretation, and there is no clarifying
gloss in its legislative history 23 The result has been a wide
range of judicial responses.
At one end of the range are statements like the one from
a New York District Court: "The term 'mental or emotional
injury' has a well understood meaning as referring to such
things as stress, fear, and depression, and other psychological
impacts."24 Other courts have arrived at similar results from
the opposite direction, asserting, for example, that "[a] prisoner
is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First
Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or
emotional injury he may have sustained."25 At the other
extreme are cases exemplified by Allah v. Al-Hafeez,26 in which
the prisoner complained that prison policies prevented him
from attending services of his religion, and the court, in the
23 In general, the legislative history of the PLRA is remarkably thin with
respect to the purpose and operation of many of its provisions, including this one. The
only substantial legislative report addresses an earlier version of the bill which did not
include that provision. See H.R. REP. No. 104-21, at 24-28 (1995). The conference
report merely reports the language of the provision without explanation. See H.R. REP.
NO. 104-378, at 65-77 (1995). The floor debate consisted mainly of rhetorical assertions
about "liberal federal judges who micromanage State and local prison systems," 141
CONG. REC. S14413, S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995), the need for criminals to do
"hard time," ild. at S14419, and prisoners' "churning out lawsuits with no regard to this
cost or their legal merit." Id. at S14419. There were also many anecdotes about
supposed frivolous prisoner lawsuits over melted ice cream, 141 CONG. REC. S14611,
S14629, the wrong brand of sneakers, 141 CONG. REC S14413, S14418, etc. The only
reference to a case of mental or emotional injury without physical injury is to a
California prisoner who "claimed that he suffered mental anguish worrying that tear
gas would be used if he refused to exit his cell." 141 CONG. REC. S14611, S14628. It is
unaccompanied by any discussion of the application of the statutory language, and
other references to the mental/emotional injury provision are similarly devoid of
interpretive gudance. See 141 CONG. REC. S7523, S7525; 141 CONG. REC. S14413,
$14414, S14417.
24 Amaker v. Haponik, 1999 WL 76798, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
1999) (declining to dismiss First Amendment claim of interference with legal mail);
accord, Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 1999) CThe domain of the statute
is limited to suits in which mental or emotional injury is claimed.").
25 Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999).
26 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000).
2001]
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course of holding that he could not pursue a compensatory
damage claim, simply assumed that the injury for which he
sought compensation must be a mental or emotional one.27
Is not being able to go to church a mental or emotional
injury' On its face, it is a concrete deprivation that occurs in
the real world and not in someone's head, and characterizing it
as a mental or emotional injury seems to miss the point.
Another example is arrest without probable cause,
resulting in days or more in a police precinct or jail waiting for
bail to be posted or the charges dismissed. Is the injury mental
or emotional? One would think not; it is more accurately
characterized as a deprivation of liberty, the loss both of the
general freedom of choice enjoyed by free persons and of the
specific choices, opportunities, and associations that a
particular wrongly arrested person is prevented from engaging
in. One would hope that such a fundamental deprivation would
not be dismissed as merely mental or emotional.28
The same reasomng would seem to apply to a prisoner
who is thrown in the hole (or "special housing," "intensive
management," or another of corrections' countless
euphemisms). That is, he is removed from ordinary
confinement, in which prisoners spend their sleeping hours and
some of their waking hours locked in their cells, but are able to
leave their cells during the day to work at jobs or attend prison
programs, to go to a congregate recreation yard or gym, a
library, or a day room with a television. Instead, he is placed
into a regime of twenty three-hour cell confinement, deprived
of most of the limited personal property allowed prisoners,
deprived of almost all the standard activities and privileges of
prison life, usually subject to strict limits on commumcations
both with outsiders and with other prisoners, and generally
condemned to idleness and monotony 2 9 Is this physical
27 Id. at 250 ("Allah seeks substantial damages for the harm he suffered as a
result of defendants' alleged violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion. As we read his complaint, the only actual injury that could form the basis for
the award he seeks would be mental and/or emotional injury.").
28 So far it has not been so dismissed. The only case on point known to me
holds, albeit conclusorily, that a claim of arrest without probable cause is not one for
mental or emotional injury. Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D.N.J. 1998).
29 See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230-32 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing
"normal" conditions in disciplinary Special Housing Unit); Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F Supp.
2d 615, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (describing harsher SHU conditions at SHU-only
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removal from ordinary prison life to a much more restricted
and often explicitly pumitive setting only a mental or emotional
injury9 Some of the limited case law to date suggests that it
may be.30 Moreover, that view has been applied to cases
alleging segregated confinement under conditions so squalid as
arguably to violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual pumshment.31
In my view, such decisions are in error. The "minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities" guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment means more than freedom from physical, mental,
or emotional injury 3 2 Dismissing claims of grossly oppressive
conditions as involving "merely" mental or emotional injury
appears inconsistent with Eighth Amendment doctrine as set
forth by the Supreme Court, under which it is the objective
seriousness of the conditions, and not a prisoner's perceptions
or reactions to them, that determines their lawfulness. 33
Describing a claim alleging conditions that are objectwely
intolerable as an "action for mental or emotional injury" seems
facility).
30 See Higgs v. Carver, 2000 WL 1902190, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2000);
Taormma v. Phillips, 2000 WL 1923511, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2000).3 1 Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (barring compensatory
damage claims for placement in filthy cells where plaintiff was exposed to the
deranged behavior of psyclhatric patients).
This view is not unanimous. In Waters v. Andrews, 2000 WL 1611126
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000), the plaintiff alleged that after she requested mental health
care, she was placed in a filthy punishment cell, kept in a soiled and bloody paper
gown, demed a shower and other personal hygiene measures, and exposed to the view
of male correctional staff and construction workers. The court held inter alia that her
Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims were not subject to § 1997e(e) because mental
or emotional distress is not a necessary element of either claim. Id. at *4.
32 Cf. Austin v. Hopper, 15 F Supp. 2d 1210, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding
that deprivation of "basic human necessities" of toilet facilities "plainly violates the
Eighth Amendment," as does failure to permit prisoners who have soiled themselves to
clean their bodies; PLRA not discussed).
33 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); see Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 35-37 (1993) (instructing as to objective assessment of environmental tobacco
smoke exposure). To establish that prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prisoners must show both a
subjective component and an objective component. The former turns on the state of
mind of the responsible officials, which in most cases must amount to deliberate
indifference or knowing disregard of prisoners' rghts. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837-38 (1994). The latter requires a showing of conditions amounting to
"unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs" or of the "nmmal




to miss the mark considerably, even if such injury (not
surprisingly) results from those conditions. Of course,
subjection of prisoners to such conditions is likely to result in
mental or emotional injury,34 but that fact does not make the
resulting lawsuit an action "for" mental or emotional injury It
is an action "for" the redress of objectively unconstitutional
prison conditions, 35 and mental or emotional injury is at most
an additional element of damages to be considered if a violation
of the Constitution is found.
What is striking and disappointing about the case law
under § 1997e(e) is not only the courts' failure to adopt this
suggested approach, but also their widespread failure even to
ask the right question about the nature of constitutional
protections and the interests that they serve.86 The Bill of
Rights, the fundamental charter of American liberty, protects
more than just freedom from physical, mental, or emotional
injury and to characterize its violation solely in those terms
trivializes it. A construction of § 1997e(e) that respects the
scope of our liberty requires that courts define these
protections in a way that acknowledges that there is more to
34 For example, one court has observed that it is both obvious and supported
by "plenty of medical and psychological literature" that prolonged isolated confinement
inflicts "substantial psychological damage." Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310,
1313, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988), (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of
Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983)); accord, Baraldini v. Meese,
691 F Supp. 432, 446-47 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 884 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1989); cf. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (stating, of the Nineteenth Century
use of solitary confinement: "A considerable number of prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still committed suicide; while
those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community.").
35 See, e.g., Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
"[t]he loss of amenities within prison is a recoverable item of damages," provable by
testimony concerning differences in physical conditions, daily routine, etc., the court
does not mention mental or emotional injury as part of the analysis).
36 There are a few honorable exceptions in a small body of case law that limits
the application of § 1997e(e) to cases in which mental or emotional injury is central to
or an element of the claim, not a potential element of damages. See Shaheed-
Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D. Mass. 2001) ('Where the harm that
is constitutionally actionable is physical or emotional injury occasioned by a violation
of rights, § 1997e(e) applies. In contrast, where the harm that is constitutionally
actionable is the violation of intangible rights-regardless of actual physical or
emotional mjury--§ 1997e(e) does not govern."); Waters v. Andrews, 2000 WL 1611126
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000).
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constitutionally protected interests such as freedom of speech
and the free exercise of religion than protection from
psychological injury
The third large question raised by § 1997e(e) is what is
an "action for mental or emotional injury"9 Generally, an
"action" is a lawsuit, and the plain meamng of the statute is
that if an action is determined to be one "for mental or
emotional injury," that action is barred from federal court
absent some physical injury
Applying that language literally leads to problems
under the liberal joinder rules of the federal courts, which
permit the amalgamation into a single suit of "as many claims,
legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an
opposing party "s7 A reading of the statute that requires
dismissal of an entire multi-claim suit simply because of the
presence of any claim for mental or emotional injury without
physical injury "would be not only gratuitous, but also contrary
to the fundamental procedural norm that when a complaint
has both good and bad claims only the bad claims are
dismissed; the complaint as a whole is not."38 However, the
courts have gone much further than this: they have
disassembled "actions" not just into claims, but into elements
of relief. For example, the decision discussed above that held
the deprivation of churchgoing to be a mental or emotional
injury did not dismiss the plaintiffs entire case; rather, it held
that the claim for compensatory damages was barred but that
the claims for nominal and punitive damages could go
forward.3 9 In effect, this court and those ruling similarly have
rewritten a statute that bars the filing of a certain kind of civil
action so that it bars the award of certain kinds of damages
instead. In doing so they have sidestepped the difficult task of
making sense out of the statutory term "action for mental
or emotional injury 40
3 7 FED. R. CIV. P 18(a).
38 Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1999).
39 Allah, 226 F.3d at 251. Other courts have made similar distinctions.
See, e.g., Wagnoon v. Gatson, 2001 WL 709276, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2001); Waters
v. Andrews, 2000 WL 1611126, at *7, *9 (alternate holding); Marrie v. Nickels, 70 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1264 (D. Kan. 1999); Mason v. Schriro, 45 F Supp. 2d 709, 720-21
(W.D. Mo. 1999).
40 As noted supra at note 36, a few cases limit the scope of § 1997e(e) to cases
in which mental or emotional injury is central to or an element of the claim, not a
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The application of § 1997e(e) is far from settled.
However, as the case law is presently developing, it appears
the statute at best has dealt a severe blow to prisoners' ability
to enforce fundamental constitutional rights. The preservation
of injunctive relief by Zehner and its progeny, while valuable,
does not affect the vast bulk of prisoner litigation, which
consists of damage claims.41 The reason for this preponderance
is that much of the unconstitutional conduct by staff to be
found in prisons and jails is not a matter of regulations or
acknowledged policies. Rather, it consists of arbitrary and/or
retaliatory actions, often contrary to official policy, directed
toward particular prisoners who are deemed troublesome, in
many cases because of behavior that is at least arguably
protected by the Constitution.42 Such behavior is rarely
amenable to injunctive relief, and even in instances where an
informal custom or policy could in theory be shown,43 prisoners
proceeding pro se-as do the vast majority of prisoner litigants
in federal court4--are rarely capable of pleading and proving a
case of such complexity Similarly, holdings that prisoners may
still seek nominal and punitive damages for abusive treatment
and oppressive conditions 45 do not compensate for the
prohibition on compensatory damages. There is a high
potential element of damages. This approach is in fact more consistent with the
statutory language barring "action[s] brought for mental or emotional injury"
(emphasis added) than is the construction that disassembles the "action" and
eliminates selected elements of damages.
41 This statement is based on my reading of decisions and correspondence
with prisoners concerning litigation they have filed or intend to file, and it reflects my
observation that many of the injunctive claims included by prisoners in those suits are
not viable, either because the challenged conduct is not amenable to injunctive relief
(e.g., an assault by staff, with no evidence that the same prisoner is likely to be
assaulted again) or because the prisoner has been transferred to another institution,
thereby mooting the claim.
42 See, e.g., McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F Supp. 2d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), afrid,
237 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding damage award to prisoner convicted of
notorious police murder who had been kept in administrative segregation through
sham reviews); see also supra note 7.
43 See, e.g., Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441-42 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (affirming verdict of mumcipal deliberate indifference to routine practice of
sexual harassment of women prisoners).
44 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Challengng the
Conditions of Prisons and Jails: A Report on Section 1983 Litigation, at tbl. 6 (Dec.
1994), http:lwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpublascii/ccopaj.txt Oast visited Feb. 8, 2002)
(reporting that 96% of prisoner civil rights suits proceed pro se).
45 See supra note 39.
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threshold for the award of punitive damages, they are
discretionary even if that standard is met,46 and the reduced
prospect of damages is a significant new impediment to
prisoners' already difficult task of obtaining counsel for
meritorious litigation.47
II. LIMITS ON PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
The PLRA's provisions concerning prospective relief48
are among the most litigated portions of the statute. Unlike the
laconic mental/emotional injury provision, the prospective
relief sections are long and explicit and their consequences are
multifarious.
First, the statute sets a standard for the grant of
prospective relief in prison cases. 49 Relief "shall extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs" and the court must
find that it
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court
shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety
or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.50
46 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983); see, e.g., Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d
1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming demal of punitive damages where plaintiffs
misconduct provoked prison staffs abusive treatment); Castle v. Clymer, 15 F. Supp.
2d 640, 668-69 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying punitive damages to prisoner notwithstanding
finding of retaliation for First Amendment-protected activity).
47 While 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides generally that prevailing parties in civil
rights litigation may recover attorneys' fees that are "reasonable in relation to the
success achieved," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983), the PLRA limits fee
recovery in prisoners' cases to 150% of the judgment, up to 25% of which must be paid
from the prisoner's recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). Thus, an attorney representing a
prisoner who recovers nominal damages of $1.00 (a not uncommon occurrence in
prisoners' cases enforcing First Amendment and other intangible rights) and no
punitive damages will be entitled to a fee of $1.50. See Boivn v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40
(lst Cir. 2000).
48 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
49 The statute defines prospective relief as "all relief other than compensatory
monetary damages." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). Read literally, that definition would
include nominal and punitive damages. The courts have not suggested that the statute
be read that literally.
50 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
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In addition, the court must refrain from ordering local or state
officials to exceed their authority or to violate local or state law
unless it is necessary to remedy a violation of federal law 51
This part of the prospective relief provisions carries a
certain rhetorical force but does not significantly change the
law 52 Courts of equity have always been expected to exercise
their powers with restraint and with concern for the external
effects that their actions may have. 53 However, one aspect of
this codification of equitable practice marks a drastic departure
from prior practice. The PLRA restricts the circumstances
under which courts may "grant or approve" prospective
relief5-i.e., its restrictions apply not only where the case is
tried and a federal law violation is found, but also in cases
where the parties decide to settle. This point is repeated in a
separate section of the statute, which states explicitly that
consent judgments can be entered only upon compliance with
the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).55 Parties may avoid
that stricture only by entering into "private settlement
agreements" which are enforceable only in state court.56 In
51 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B).
52 The federal courts have acknowledged that the PLRA standard is generally
consistent with pre-existing law. See Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1006 (9th
Cir. 2000); Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
PLRA "merely codifies existing law and does not change the standards for determining
whether to grant an injunction"); Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 133 n.21 (5th Cir.
1996); see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1986)
(applying similar standard pre-PLRA). Public safety and criminal justice system
concerns have been given great weight in injunctive prison litigation. See, e.g., Duran
v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1985) (enforcing jail crowding order). Federal
courts have required compelling justification to grant injunctions overriding state and
local law. See LaShawn A. by Moore v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(stating, in a non-PLRA case: "Disregarding local law is a grave step and should not
be taken unless absolutely necessary."); Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968
F.2d 850, 861-65 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing extent of federal courts' authority to
override state and local law).
53 See NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1990)
(The issuance of an injunction is the exercise of an equitable power, and is subject to
the equitable constraints that have evolved over centuries in recognition of the heavy
costs that injunctions can impose (including costs to innocent third parties) and the
potential severities of contempt."). Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (citing
historic "fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits"
as well as additional federalism concerns raised by intervention into state functions).
54 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
5 Id. § 3626(c)(1).
56 Id. § 3626(c)(2).
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non-prison cases, by contrast, the parties can still settle for
virtually anything they want that is not affirmatively illegal
and is not outside the scope of the litigation as framed by the
pleadings.5 7
At least in theory, this requirement undermines a large
part of the basis of injunctive settlements: the parties' desire to
avoid findings that they have acted illegally, and their desire to
avoid the burdens and publicity of a trial. In practice, courts
have been willing to approve consent judgments that stipulate
conclusorily to the required PLRA findings, 58 sometimes with
significant reservations, 59 and have not required evidentiary
proceedings to support the entry of such agreed orders. To
date, this practice appears to have remained unchallenged, and
significant injunctive settlements have been reached in some
cases subsequent to the PLEA's enactment.
Second, the prospective relief section of the PLEA also
includes provisions targeting specific types of relief.
Preliminary injunctions must not only be supported by the
need/narrowness/intrusiveness findings; their life is also
limited to ninety days unless the injunction is made final-i.e.,
the litigation completely concluded-within that time.60 Since
prison litigation of any significant scope is rarely concluded so
quickly, the utility of preliminary injunctions is thereby
5 7 See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
58 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Phoenix, No. 91 Civ. 4148 (RPP), Stipulation of
Settlement at 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1998) C'iTihe parties stipulate, based on the entire
record, that the remedies set forth m this Stipulation and Proposed Order are narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct violations of the federal rights of
the plaintiff class, and are the least intrusive means necessary to accomplish
redress ').
59 See, e.g., United States v. Clay County, Georgia, No. 4:97-CV-151, Consent
Decree (M.D. Ga. filed Aug. 20, 1997), approved, Order (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1997)
(stipulating to conclusory PLRA findings, stating that liability had not been litigated,
and disclaiming any preclusive effect except between the parties); Makinson v.
Bonneville County, No. CIV97-0190-E-BLW (D. Idaho Apr. 30, 1997) (stipulating that
agreements are not findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the parties'
claims or defenses); Lozeau v. Lake County, Montana, No. CV-95-82-M RFC, Decree at
15 (D. Mont. Oct. 23, 1996) (referring to "alleged" violation of federal rights). In some
cases, the court has supplied the PLRA findings without a stipulation from the parties.
See Duffy v. Riveland, No. C92-1596R, Stipulation and Order at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
31, 1998) (including stipulation disclaiming admissions of liability or violation and
conclusory recitation by court of the PLRA findings).
60 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(2).
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drastically reduced, probably accounting for the dearth of case
law applying this provision.61
The ability of federal courts to remedy prison
overcrowding is restricted by provisions concerning "prisoner
release orders,"62 defined as "any order, including a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the
purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population,
or that directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to
a prison."63 Such an order may be entered only if other less
intrusive relief has been tried and has failed to remedy the
violation of federal law 64 A three-judge court must be
convened,65 and may enter a prisoner release order only if it
finds by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the
"primary cause" of the federal law violation and no other relief
will correct it. 66 There has been little judicial construction of
this part of the PLRA, probably because there have been few
attempts to obtain new overcrowding relief since its
enactment.
67
61 One recent decision holds that successive preliminary injunctions may be
entered if the circumstances justifying the initial injunction remain unchanged. See
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 136 F Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (E.D. Cal.), affd, 258 F.3d 930
(9th Cir. 2001).
62 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
63 Id. § 3626(g)(4).
64 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A).
65 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(B).
66 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
67 Since enactment of the PLRA, such orders have been entered, if at all, by
consent. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, No. 86-2128 (D.D.C., Jan. 20, 1998)
(approving order by three-judge court reciting both prisoner release order and
prospective relief requirements of PLRA); Duran v. Johnson, No. 77-0721-JC, Amended
Stipulation (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 1997) (approving dormitory bed limits and square footage
requirements by single judge, with stipulation not to move under PLRA for specified
time); Lozeau v. Lake County, Montana, No. CV 95-82-M RMH (D. Mont. Oct. 23,
1996) (approving square footage requirements by single judge, reciting prospective
relief requirements of PLRA but not prisoner release order requirements).
In the widely publicized litigation about recently convicted state prisoners
retained in grossly overcrowded Alabama county jails, the federal court that entered
injunctive relief did not mention the PLRA prisoner release provisions. The reason may
be that the order did not require release of prisoners, but only their transfer from jail
to prison, and is therefore arguably not a prisoner release order. See Maynor v. Morgan
County, 147 F Supp. 2d 1185 (N.D. Ala. 2001).
Other judicial constructions of this part of the statute have been confined to
the definition of "prisoner release order," see Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 836
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a maximum population provision is a prisoner release
order); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 595-96 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding order limiting
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Finally, the most consequential aspect of the PLRA's
recasting of prospective relief law is its provision for the
termination of relief.68 Upon the filing of a motion by
defendants, the court must terminate prospective relief unless
it finds a "current and ongoing violation" of federal law and
makes the same need/narrowness/intrusiveness findings
required for the intial entry of relief. Such a motion may be
filed two years after the- entry of relief and every year
thereafter until successful. 69  In cases where the
need/narrowness/intrusiveness findings were not made when
the judgment was entered, a motion to terminate may be filed
immediately70 Such motions are directed to be decided
"promptly,171 and the cost of delay-inevitable in complex
litigation like most prison injunctive cases-is imposed entirely
on the plaintiffs: the statute provides that the mere filing of a
termination motion operates as a "stay" (better described as a
suspension) of the relief starting thirty days after the motion is
filed, which may be extended to ninety days for good cause.7 2
This automatic stay provision has been upheld by the Supreme
Court against attack based on the separation of powers
doctrine.73
Tins section of the PLRA has had immediate and
significant consequences for prisoners. In many jurisdictions,
legal protections obtained through years of labor have been
swept away 7 4 It has also had significant consequences for the
techmcal probation violator population in a jail is a prisoner release order); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F Supp. 869, 883 (D. Mass. 1997)
(holding, contra Tyler, supra, that a population cap is not a prisoner release order in
the absence of an order to release), aff'd as modified and remanded on other grounds,
129 F.3d 649 (lst Cir. 1997), and to the provision permitting state and local officials to
intervene to oppose and seek termination of prisoner release orders. Ruiz v. Estelle,
161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998).
68 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).
69 Some post-PLRA settlements have waived this right at least for
defined periods of time. See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Crawford, No.
CV-N-00-0373-HDM-RAM, Stipulation and Judgment at 6 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2000)
(agreeing not to seek to terminate for five years); Duffy v. Riveland, No. C92-1596R,
Stipulation and Order at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 1998) (agreeing not to challenge the
settlement for four years).
70 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).
71 Id. § 3626(e)(1).
72 Id. § 3626(e)(2)-(3).
73 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 348 (2000).
74 See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir.
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shape of the remedial process in prisoners' civil rights
litigation. Prior law, still applicable in non-prison cases,
recogmzed that institutional change takes time and may face
resistance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a
decree should be ended only when the defendant shows that
there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the order
for a reasonable period of tne, the defendant has exhibited a
good-faith commitment to the decree and the legal principles
that warranted judicial intervention, and the defendant is
"unlikely [to] return to its former ways."75 Now, it appears,
that likelihood of future recurrence of the constitutional
violation has been defined out of the inquiry in prisoner
cases.
76
Thus, there is a paradox at the heart of the judgment
termination provision. If a constitutional violation has been
successfully held in check by an injunction, there is no "current
and ongoing violation," and the PLRA's response is to do away
with the injunction that suppressed it. If the legal violation
recurs after the injunction is gone, Congress's answer is to file
another lawsut-an endeavor it sinultaneously made more
1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996).
75 Board of Educ. of Okla. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-50 (1991); accord,
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-93 (1992).
76 One court, while upholding the statute as a whole, has suggested m dicta
that depriving courts of the power to act in the face of the prospect of reversion to
unconstitutional practices presents a serious separation of powers problem. Gilmore v.
California, 220 F.3d 987, 1009 n.27 (9th Cir. 2000).
In any case, the notion of excluding the likelihood of future recurrence from
consideration is not as simple as it seems. Some relevant substantive legal standards
are satisfied by proof of the prospect of future injury based only on a current risk. See
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (holding risk of future damage to health
actionable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). Moreover, institutional
life and conditions do not take place instantaneously and sometimes can only be
meaningfully assessed over a period of time. Analogously, under the Clean Water Act,
the Supreme Court has observed that either "continuous or intermittent violation" can
be "ongoing noncompliance," Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987), and Justice Scalia added: "A good or lucky day is not a
state of compliance. Nor is the dubious state in wlhch a past problem is not
recurring at the moment but the cause of that problem has not been completely and
clearly eradicated." Id. at 69 (concurring opinion). In this light, statements that the
statutory phrase "current and ongoing" addresses conditions "at the time the district
court conducts the § 3626(b)(3) inquiry," Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 784 (11th
Cir. 2000), or "as of the time termination is sought," Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d
144, 166 (2d Cir. 1999), beg a significant part of the question.
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difficult.7 7 Meanwhile, since the PLRA's enactment, much of
the already scarce resources for litigation advancing prisoners'
rights has been consumed in defending past gains against
motions to terminate.
In addition to its practical consequences for prisoners,
the PLRA termination provision has significantly compromised
the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers
doctrine. One of the most basic principles of the separation of
powers doctrine is the inmumty of the final judgment of an
Article III court from legislative revision.7 8 Yet the PLRA has
commanded the termination of injunctions, many of which
were entered years before the terms of the PLRA were
conceived, much less enacted.
The courts have rationalized this result by holding, in
effect, that injunctions are not final in the same way that a
money judgment is final. Injunctions remain "subject to
alteration due to changes in the underlying law"7 9 This is a
familiar and unobjectionable proposition in cases enforcing
statutory rights since, otherwise, courts might find themselves
enforcing rights that Congress has altered or abolished.80 One
77 At the same time Congress passed this invitation to litigation do-overs, it
enacted the administrative exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which my
conversations with other practitioners as well as my own practice suggest is now the
major practical obstacle to the commencement of new injunctive litigation on behalf of
prisoners. Congress also passed restrictions on the attorneys' fees recoverable in prison
litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), with the purpose and effect of making it more difficult
for prisoners to obtain counsel, and, in addition, prohibited recipients of funds from the
federal Legal Services Corporation from representing prisoners. Legal Services
Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 504(a)(15), 110 Stat. 1321-55 (2001).
78 That principle was not formally announced by the Supreme Court until
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). Justice Scalia indicated that its
belated proclamation simply reflected its status as a constitutional no-bramer: "Apart
from the statute we review today, we know of no instance in which Congress has
attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article HI court by retroactive
legislation. That prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not
understood to be constitutionally proscribed." Id. at 230.
79 Miller, 530 U.S. at 344-45. While Miller addressed the constitutionality of
the PLRAfs automatic stay provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e), its separation of powers
rationale is essentially the same as that of the courts of appeals in upholding the
judgment termination provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b). See, e.g., Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 161-62 (2d Cir.1999) (en banc); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d
1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1088 (8th Cir. 1997).
80 See System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961), in which a consent decree
forbade umon and employer from discriminating against non-union workers. After
Congress amended the Railway Labor Act to permit union shops, thus specifically
allowing discrimination against non-umon workers, the Supreme Court held that the
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would think this principle inapplicable in constitutional cases,
where the law being enforced is immune from legislative
modification. However, courts applying the PLRA have
identified the relevant change in law as Congress's action in
"establishing new standards for the enforcement of prospective
relief in § 3626(b)."81 Thus, even if constitutionally based, an
existing judgment can be changed by Congress if Congress
changes the law of judgments.82
This tautological analysis places constitutional cases on
a similar footing to statutory cases for purposes of
congressional second-guessing. It essentially destroys, for
injunctive cases, the principle of immunity of Article III
judgments from legislative revision that the Court announced
so vigorously in Plaut v. Spendthrtft Farm, Inc.83 only a year
before the PLRA's enactment. This result has troubled only one
of the appeals courts that has passed on the question. That
court distinguished between the constitutionally troublesome
act of terminating final judgments and the more benign
alternative of merely depriving those judgments of prospective
effects, holding that the PLRA merely accomplished the
latter.84 This distinction between the prospective effect of a
judgment, the only purpose of which is to have prospective
effect, and the judgment itself-a distinction the court itself
termed "formalist" though "seminal"85-is reminiscent of the
old joke. that defines legal reasoning as the art of thinking
about something that is inextricably intertwined with
something else but without thinking of the something else.
Forget life imitating art; here, the law imitates satire.
consent decree should be modified to bring it into conformity with the amended
statute. Id. at 651.
81 Miller, 530 U.S. at 346-47; accord, Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 839
(7th Cir. 1999) (stating that "new criteria for relief' are "a constitutionally sufficient
ground for reopening the prospective component of a judgment"); Benjamin, 172 F.3d
at 161.
82 Characterizing this PLRA provision as a change in law permitted the Court
to dismiss as inapposite the holding of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), that
Congress may not "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the
government in cases pending before it." Id. at 146.
83 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
84 Gilmore v. State of California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000).
85 Id. at 1003.
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To appreciate the significance of this doctrinal
development for enforcement of constitutional rights, it is
necessary to consider it in conjunction with one of the Supreme
Court's prior decisions concerning separation of powers,
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,8 6 part of the highly
publicized controversy over protection of the Northern spotted
owl. While the case was pending, Congress passed the
Northwest Timber Compromise statute,87 which provided that
compliance with certain provisions of that new law would be
deemed to constitute compliance with other provisions of prior
law To make its intent crystal clear, Congress cited the
pending litigation by caption and docket number.88 The
Supreme Court found nothing offensive to the separation of
powers in this legislatively directed resolution of pending
federal court proceedings, since it amended existing statutory
law, albeit narrowly 89 The Court was untroubled by the fact
that the legislation was explicitly shaped to dictate the result
in particular pending cases.
Putting these pieces together, Robertson stands for the
proposition that where Congress has the substantive power to
legislate, it can do so in a way that is targeted and tailored to
particular pieces of litigation. The PLRA cases, including the
Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. French,90 appear to give
Congress the equivalent power to legislate with respect to the
remedial powers of the courts in constitutional cases and to
86 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
87 See Dep't of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, §§ 1 et
seq., 318, 103 Stat. 701 (1990).
88 In Congress's own words:
[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of
areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section is
adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory
requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned
Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160
and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F Dale Robertson,
Civil No. 89-99 and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v.
Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civ. No. 87-1160-FR.
Robertson, 503 U.S. at 434-35 (quoting Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, 108 Stat. 745, § 318(b)(6)(A)).
89 Id. at 438-41. In so characterizing Congress's action, the Court
dismissed the argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the rule of Klein,
80 U.S. at 146, which forbids Congress to "prescribe rules of decision" for the judiciary
m particular cases. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441.
90 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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apply new laws to prior judgments. The emerging syllogism
would seem to be completed by the proposition that now, if a
federal court does something that Congress does not like in the
course of enforcing the Constitution, Congress can direct the
termination or the modification of that specific judicial act. It
cannot (yet) reverse a court's finding that the Constitution was
violated. But arguably it could say, for example: the judgment
will have a life of only one year; or the particular kind of
remedy that appears in this judgment must terminate
immediately and can only be reinstated after the court has
tried six other remedies and made findings based on a new
record that they did not work; or even that Congress
disapproves the lnd of remedy prescribed in paragraph forty-
four of an injunction, and that paragraph will terminate upon
enactment of the legislation. Thus, a recalcitrant litigant
aggrieved by a federal court injunctive order now has de facto a
continuing right of appeal to the legislative branch in addition
to the usual single appeal to an appeals court. One need only
try to envision the course of Southern school desegregation,
had such a rule been in effect during the late 1950s and the
1960s, to appreciate the havoc that may be in store for the
judicial enforcement process in future acrinomous civil rights
controversies.
Can this possibly be the law? One would think and hope
not. Certainly, such a formulation, which would make
Congress a collateral appeals court and in some cases a co-
manager of constitutional litigation, contravenes the idea of
separation of powers in the most literal fashion. It crashes
head-on into the more specific command that the decisions of
an Article III court may not be reviewed and revised by other
branches of government.91 But the appeals courts and the
Supreme Court seem, at least rhetorically, to have painted the
law into a corner, leaving no identifiable doctrinal stopping
place to the incursion of the legislature on the remedial powers
91 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc., v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 113 (1948) ('Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned, or refused faith
and credit by another Department of Government."); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
Appx. 697, 700-04 (1864) (opinion of Taney, J.) (holding judgments of Article III courts
"final and conclusive" and not subject to review by a non-Article III body); Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. 409, 411 (1792).
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of the federal courts in constitutional cases, other than the bare
proposition that Congress cannot overturn a finding of
constitutional violation. By dismantling important parts of the
conceptual armory of the separation of powers, they have
opened the door to a new and genuinely radical proposition of
legislative supremacy over the work of the courts. And until
and unless the courts devise new (or refurbish old) conceptual
tools to defend their remedial authority replacing those they
have kicked aside in upholding the PLRA, the constitutional
rights, not just of prisoners, but of all litigants, will have lost
much of the security historically afforded by our independent
judiciary Consistent with the familiar logic of Pastor
Niemoller,92 persons other than prisoners may soon have good
reason to regret the enactment and the judicial embrace of this
statute.
CONCLUSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act represents a
fundamental shift in the long-running debate about court
stripping. The vexed question whether Congress may exclude
controversial constitutional issues from federal judicial review,
never definitively answered, is effectively sidestepped by the
PLRA, which instead imposes a series of restrictions and
disincentives on congressionally disfavored litigants and
disfavored claims. Individually and cumulatively, these
provisions significantly impair the enforcement of
constitutional rights and erode the principle of separation of
powers, and they drastically compromise the ideal of equal
justice under law, creating a class of second-class litigants and
second-class constitutional claims. The judiciary has failed to
date to respond effectively to these incursions on its
92 In Germany they came first for the communists, and I didn't speak
up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I
didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade
unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was
a Protestant. Then they came for me, and by that time no one was left
to speak up.
Martin Niemoller, quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 684 (Justin
Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
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independence, or even to suggest definable limits on
congressional power to make such incursions. This failure
suggests that the structure of constitutional enforcement
through judicial review may now be at sigmficant risk, not of
wholesale abolition, but of impotence imposed piecemeal by
restrictive measures directed at popular and legislative
scapegoats du jour
